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B OTH Vigmore' and Mary Hume Maguire - find the roots of the
privilege against self-incrimination in the resistance of Eng-
lishmen to the so-called oath ex officio of the ecclesiastical courts.
Wigmore thinks that until 1533 the opposition was confined to
issues of the scope of eccelesiastical jurisdiction, while Mrs.
Maguire sees persuasive evidence of much earlier objection to its
use in situations where jurisdiction was unquestioned. The offen-
sive characteristic of the procedure of which the oath was a part
was its requirement that a person who had not been charged by a
formal presentment or accusation answer under oath all questions
put to him by the proper ecclesiastical official. The purpose of the
inquiry was to discover suspected violations of church law or
custom, or to establish the truth of either vague or definite charges
not disclosed to the person questioned. The earlier form of the
oath was introduced in the ecclesiastical courts of England in 1236,
the later form in 1272.
If we may believe Matthew Paris, 3 Grosseteste, Bishop of
*Royall Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
1. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2250 (3d ed. 1940).
2. Essays in History and Political Theory in honor of Charles Howard
McIlwain, c. VII, Attack of the Common Lawyers on the Oath Ex Officio
as Administered in the Ecclesiastical Courts in England, p. 199 (Cambridge
1936). Hereafter referred to as Maguire.
3. IV Matthaei Parisiensis Chronica Majora 579. The text is as
follows:
[Qualiter episcopus Lincolniensis desoevit in suos subjectos.]
His quoque diebus, cum episcopus The king forbids
Lincolniensis supra quam deceret vel the inquisitions
expediret, in subjectos suos, ad sug- established by
gestionem, ut dicitur, Praedicatorum bishop Grosseteste
et Minorum, desaeviret; ita scilicet ut in his diocese.
faceret inquisitiones districtas per
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Lincoln, in 1246 instituted rigid inquiries into the conduct and
morals of both great and humble in his diocese, thereby causing
serious injury to the reputation of many. This brought bitter com-
plaints from the people; and the king with the advice of his council
wrote the sheriff of Hertforde, commanding him not to allow any
laymen of his bailiwick to appear before the Bishop or his officials
and make answer under oath in any causes except those involving
matrimony or testaments. The bishop then declared that the king
wanted to follow in the footsteps of certain conspirators who had
already exhibited similar audacities in France. This Prynne char-
acterizes as "an insolent, undutiful answer of a furious turbulent
willful Prelate."'4 He then relates the later stages of the controversy
of Henry III with the bishop, accurately quoting the close rolls. In
the following year in consequence of the bishop's disobedience a new
writ was issued to the sheriff directing him to put the bishop under
gage and surety to appear before the king and his justices to show
why he had caused laymen and laywomen to be summoned to take
the newly devised oath.5 The bishops of Gloucester and of Wor-
cester followed the example of the bishop of Lincoln, and similar
archidiaconos et decanos suos in epis-
copatu suo de continentia et moribus
tam nobilium quam ignobilium, in
A.D. 1246 enormem laesionem famae multorum et
scandalum, quod nunquam fieri con-
sueverat; dominus rex audiens super
hoc populi graves querimonias, con-
silio curiae suae, scripsit vicecomiti
Hertfordiae in haec verba:
"Henricus Dei gratia rex Angliae,
"etc. Praecipimus tibi, quod sicut teip-
"sum et omina tua diligis, non per-
"mittas quod aliqui laici de balliva tua
"ad voluntatem episcopi Lincolniensis
"archidiaconorum vel officialium seu
"decanorum ruralium in aliquo loco
"conveniant de caetero, ad recogni-
"tiones per sacramentum eorum vel
"attestationes aliquas faciendas, nisi in
causis matrimonialibus vel testamen-
"tariis." Quod cum audisset episcopus,
asserebat dominum regem quorundam
conspiratorum qui jam in Francia in
consimilem audaciam proruperunt, de
quibus in sequenti folio plenius enar-
ratur, vestigia secuturum.
4. William Prynne, An Exact Chronological Vindication and His-
torical Demonstration of our British, Roman, Saxon, Norman, English
Kings Supream Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, The Second Tome 699 (1666-
dedication dated 1665).
5. Id. at 705. The writ is found in the Close Rolls for the thirty-third




writs were in 1251 addressed to them;6 and in the next year the
king directed a mandate to the bishop of Lincoln stating that he had
received complaints that the bishop and his officials were still
harassing the people of his diocese by citing them to appear and
excommunicating them for failure to do so and compelling them
to give testimony upon oath of the private sins of others, whereby
many Christians were shamefully defamed and might incur the
dangers of perjury; he therefore forbade the bishop to continue
these practices and warned that unless he did desist, royal punish-
ment would follow ("vos sustiners non poterimus ulterius quin ad
hoc manus regias apponemus").
In the Articuli Clerk of 9 Edward IP are set forth the rights
of the clergy and their courts to be free from interference in specified
situations by lay officials and from writs of prohibition by the
King's justices. At a later date in the same reign, the Prohibitio
formata de Statuto Articuli Cleri,9 addressed to the prelates and
ecclesiastical officials of the diocese of Norwich, put definite limits
to their authority. It first specified numerous causes of which the
King's Courts had exclusive jurisdiction, stated that the ecclesi-
astical officials had, as the King was reliably informed, been drawing
some of them into their courts, and expressly prohibited them from
holding such pleas in their courts. Next, it commanded the sheriffs
to forbid them from doing so, and, if they violated the prohibition,
to put them under gage and pledge to appear before the King's
justices at Westminster. Then comes the sentence:
"Et quod non permittant quod aliqui laici in balliva sua in aliqui-
hus locis conveniant ad aliquos recognitiones per sacramenta sua
facienda, nisi in causis matrimonialibus et testamentariis.'
The sentence following this, like those preceding it, refers to the
exercise of jurisdiction by the spiritual judges over such (hujus-
modi) fees, debts and chattels. The Prohibitio ends with a command
that the sheriffs report what the ecclesiastical officials shall do in
this behalf. The English translation of the quoted sentence given
in the Statutes of the Realm, following the 1603 edition of Rastall,
is :
o. Id. at 554.
7. Close Rolls of the Reign of Henry III (1251-1253) 224-225 (1927)
Prynne op. cit. supra note 4, at 705, 706.
8. 1 Statutes of the Realm 171 (1315-16).
9. Id. at 209 (date uncertain).
10. In the original text a number of words are abbreviated in the
customary manner. Wigmore's quotation has "ballione" in place of "balliva."
\i ,.xorc, oi. tit. su, a n ,t- 1, at 278. Mrs. Maguire's quotation agrees with
1 Statutes of the Realm 209 as quoted in the text. Maguire, op. cit. supra
note 2. at 20 i.
1949]
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"And they suffer not that any Laymen within their Bailiwick,
come together in any Places to make any such Recognitions by their
Oaths, except in Causes of Matrimony and Testamentary."'"
This translation entirely disregards two important items. First,
in every other part of the Prohibitio, wherever causes or pleas of
the same sort are referred to, the reference is in unmistakable terms.
Here the most indefinite adjective, "aliquis," is used both as to the
"recognitiones" and as to the places. Second, this sentence contains
the only reference to the oath procedure. Consequently, it seems
that this language ought not to be limited by the context, and would
be more reasonably interpreted as a direction to the sheriffs to
prohibit any laymen to come together in any place for any examina-
tions or investigations to be made under their oaths, except in
causes matrimonial or testamentary.
Baldwin informs us that in criminal cases before the King's
Council during this same period the accused was required to
appear in person, without counsel, and to "answer the charges,
which were most likely not known to him in advance.... If he did
not immediately confess or satisfactorily explain the charges, he was
put to the method known as the interrogatory examination. This
was an acknowledged feature of the civil and canonical law, which
in its extreme form was pursued by the church especially but not
exclusively in heresy trials. It was a method that was creeping into
secular practice, in the courts of king's bench and common pleas, as
early as the reign of Edward I .... As practically administered the
examinations were of several kinds or degrees, according to the
nature of the case and the advancement of the art of questioning."'12
This practice brought protests from the Commons with promises
from the King that henceforth it would not be done without reason. 1
And in the 25th year of Edward III, a statute, referring to Magna
Charta, declared that "from henceforth none shall be taken by
petition or suggestion made to our lord the King, or to his Council,
unless it be by indictment or presentation of good and lawful people
of the same neighborhood where such deeds be done, in due manner,
or by process made by writ original at the common law; . ." In
1368 another statute provided that in order "to eschew the mischiefs
and damages" done by causing persons falsely accused to be brought
11. 1 Statutes of the Realm 209.
12. Select Cases before the King's Council (1243-1482) edited for the
Selden Society by I. S. Leadam and J. F. Baldwin, xlii, Vol. 35 (1918).
13. II Rotuli Parliamentorum 168, item 28 (1347).
14. 1 Statutes of the Realm, 319, 321 (IV) (1351-2). (In original all
nouns are capitalized.)
[ Vol. 34: 1
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before the King's Council by writ, no man should "be put to answer
without presentment before justices, or matter of record, or by due
process and writ original, according to the old law of the land." 15
These authorities seem to indicate that at these early dates the
opposition to inquiries of this sort was not confined to jurisdiction.
It could hardly be urged that the Courts Christian had no jurisdic-
tion over heresy, nor could it be maintained that the King's Council
was without power to make the investigations in question. No
doubt the King was more interested in the jurisdictional question
than in the procedure, but it was clearly the forced subjection to
inquisitional procedure that aroused the opposition to Grosseteste
and caused the protests against the action of the King's Council.
And it is more reasonable to conclude that the same issue was
involved in the Prohibitio. Consequently Wigmore's brusque dis-
missal of Mrs. Maguire's contention on the ground of her lack of
acquaintance with the common law authorities carries little weight.
The bishops of Lincoln and Worcester were not alone in their
resistance to these limitations. The prelates in some inexplicable
manner had a purported Act of Parliament put on the statute books
as having been enacted in the second session of the parliament in the
fifth year of Richard II, which in terms gave them the power they
wanted against heretics."' After reciting that "divers evil persons"
had preached in various places to great congregations "divers
sermons containing heresies and notorious errors," and had dis-
obeyed summons and citations of the ordinaries and cared not for
the censures of the Holy Church, the statute authorized sheriffs to
be directed to hold such persons "in arrest and strong prison"
until "they will justify them according to the law and reason of
Holy Church." But at the very next session the Commons declared
that they had never assented to this enactment and asked that it be
declared void.'7 And to this the King gave his assent. Under
Henry IV, however, the clergy succeeded in getting a much more
drastic statute,"' aimed especially at the Lollards, which not only
forbade such heretical preaching but authorized the Diocesan to
arrest any person "in this behalf defamed or evidently suspected"' 9
and to imprison him until he canonically purged himself, and
abjured the heretical opinions "according as the laws of the church
15. Id. at 388 (III) (1368).
16. 2 Statutes of the Realm 25-26 (1382).
17. 3 Rotuli Parliamentorum 141, item 53.
18. 2 Statutes of the Realm 125 (2 Hen. IV c. 15, 1401).
19. Id. at 127.
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do require, '20 so that the "diocesan do openly and judicially proceed
• . .and determine that same business according to the Canonical
decrees within three months after the said arrest ... This statute
was strengthened in 1414,22 and provided for turning over to the
ecclesiastical courts persons indicted for heresy. For a century and
a third the lay authorities and courts cooperated with the ecclesiasti-
cal courts in the prosecution of heretics. Under Henry VIII the
opposition to the oath ex officio again became vocal; and in 1533,
in "An Act for punysshement of Heresye," it was specifically pro-
vided that "every person and persons being presented or indicted
of [heresye] or duly accused or detected thereof by two lawful
wytnesses at the leest to any Ordynaries of this Realme havyng
power to examyne heresyes, shall and may after every suche accu-
sacion or presentment and none otherwyse nor by any other meanes
be cited convented arrested taken or apprehended by any the seid
Ordynaries or any other the Kynges mynysters and subjectes who
soo ever." After being apprehended they were to be committed to
answer "in open Courte and in an open place to their such accusa-
cion and presentmentis."23 This clearly was designed to prohibit
the oath ex officio. Six years later "An Act abolishing diversity in
Opynions" specified the forbidden opinions, the teaching or holding
of which was made punishable, and provided a detailed procedure
for accusation, process and trial.2 Under Mary, the statutes and
practices of Henry VIII were repealed; those of Henry IV and the
repudiated statute of Richard II were revived.
In the first year of the reign of Elizabeth all these measures of
Mary were undone. An act was passed "restoring to the Crowne
thauncyent Jurisdiction over the state, Ecclesiastical and Spiritual
and abolyshing all forreine Power repugnaunt to the same." In the
most sweeping terms it united and annexed to the imperial crown
"all such jurisdictions privileges, superiorities and preeminences
spiritual and ecclesiastical as by any spiritual or ecclesiastical power
or authority hath heretofore been or may lawfully be exercised or
used." It authorized the Queen by letters patent to delegate to Com-
missioners her power and authority "to visit reform redress order
correct and amend all such errors, heresies scisms abuses offences
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid. The statute also provided that those who did not abjure
should be turned over to the sheriff to be publicly burned, and is consequently
commonly called "De Heretico Comburendo."
22. Id. at 181 (2 Henry V, c. 7, 1414).
23. 3 Statutes of the Realm 454, 455 (25 Henry VIII, c. 14, 1533).
24. Id. at 739, 741-742 (31 Henry VIII, c. 14, 1539).
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contempts and enormities." -" In the earlier letters patent or commis-
sions, nothing was said about the oath ex officio, but in 1583 the
Commissioners, who came to be known, and to regard themselves,
as the Court of High Commission, were specifically authorized to
use this oath procedure. 2 Certainly this Court had jurisdiction over
causes matrimonial and testamentary, and specifically over heresy
as defined in the statutes of Henry VIII. To what extent could
its Commissioners lawfully use this oath?
There can be no doubt that in the reign of Elizabeth the com-
mon law courts nullified the penalties imposed by the Commissioners
upon accused persons for refusal to take the oath, but there is much
doubt as to the reason for their action. In the famous case of
Burrowes and others against the High Commission Courts, 27 Coke
cites and comments upon three decisions2- from the earlier years
of the reign of Elizabeth. The High Commission had imprisoned
Skrogges for refusal to answer under oath concerning title to an
office, Hynde concerning usury, and Leigh concerning the hearing
of masses. The common law court released each of them on habeas
corpus, so Coke says, because "nemo tenetur se ipsum prodere." As
to the first two Coke's statement differs from that of Dyer, who re-
ports that the release was ordered because the petitioner "was
a person in the court and a necessary member of it." Leigh's Case,
Coke asserted, was not reported by Dyer in the printed book but in
a "manuscript written with his own hand, which book I have..." ;
Leigh was an attorney of the Common Bench, the eccelesiastical
judges committed him to the Fleet for refusal to answer them as to
the hearing of masses, and the Common Bench issued a habeas
corpus and upon the return, said: "Quod nemo tenetur se ipsum
prodere and for this cause then delivered him." In Attorney General
v. Mico, 2 11 in resisting a bill for discovery, defendant's counsel cited
these cases and other statements by Coke, all indicating that the
25. 4 Id. at 350, 352 (1 Eliz. 1558-1559). In the quotation the spelling
is modernized.
26. In Caudry's Case, 5 Coke's Reports viii (33 Eliz., ed. of 1777), it
was resolved that this "was not a statute introductory of a new law, but
declaratory of the old."
27. 3 Bulstrode 48 (_13 James I).
28. Scrogs Case, reported as Skrogges v. Coleshil, Dyer 175a (1 & 2
Eliz.) (ed. of 1744) ; Hyndes Case, reported in a note as Hind, Dyer 175b
(stated by Coke to have been decided in 10 Eliz.) ; and Lee's Case, also
called Leigh's Case (18 Eliz.).
29. Hardres 137, 143 (1658). There are cases in the reign of James I
where writs of prohibition were granted against examination under oath
concerning criminating matters, though there was no doubt that the court
was acting within its jurisdiction. See, e.g., Spendlow v. Smith, Hob. 84
(1615) ; Latters v. Sussex, Noy 151 (date uncertain).
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maxim had been used as the basis for decision in Elizabeth's reign
for the protection of defendants against disclosure under oath of
matter which would subject them to penalty or forfeiture.
Wigmore insists that Coke's misstatement of the Skrogges and
Hyndes cases is demonstrated by the report in Dyer, and that Coke
was equally inaccurate as to Leigh's case. He intimates that Coke
was substituting for the facts his wishful thinking, which first
appears in his advocacy for the petitioners in Collier and Collier in
the Common Bench in 158930 where he sought, and, according to
two of the accounts, obtained a writ prohibiting the spiritual courts
from examining them on charges of incontinency. The statement
in Croke is that the prohibition was granted because "nemo tenetur
prodere se ipsum"; that in Moore, "quia ils ne doyent eux mesmes
prodere lou discredit ensue." Leonard ends his short report: "Et
nemo tenetur se ipsum prodere: but the court would advise of it."
Since these reports were first published in 1657, 1687, and 1688,
respectively, Wigmore would doubtless urge that the reporters
probably accepted Coke's erroneous interpretation. It is certain that
in Dr. Hunt's case, 31 the King's Bench held it lawful for the spiritual
court to put a person to his oath concerning incontinency "where
the offence is first presented by two men."
It will be noted that all these cases involve the power of the
church courts or High Commission to administer the oath or to
punish for refusal to take it, and that in each case it does notappear
that the person summoned had been formally charged with an
offense. The spiritual court could not require him se ipsum prodere.
In his first essay Wigmore says that prodere means "to disclose
for the first time," "to reveal what was before unknown. '3 2 Accord-
ing to Harper's Latin Dictionary the word's primary meaning is
"to give, put or bring forth" and its secondary meaning "to disclose,
discover, betray." Such a translation as "discover" would justify
Wigmore's interpretation and would harmonize the decisions before
1583, which prohibit the "ex officio" oath, and yet do not prohibit
30. Reported in 4 Leon. 194; Cro. Eliz. 201; Moore 906. Mrs. Maguire,
referring to the assertion made by both Bentham and Wigmore, that Coke's
use of "Nemo tenetur se ipsum prodere" is the first instance in which it is
lifted from its accepted place in a single sentence, says that though this may
be true as to its appearance in a law report, "there are many instances of
its use earlier, even fifty years before," and gives citations to them. 'Maguire.
op. cit. supra note 2, at 223-224. The unquestioned maxim was "Licet nemo
tenetur seipsum prodere, tamen proditus per famam tenetur seipsum ostendere
utrum possit suam innocentiam ostendere et seipsum purgare."
31. Cro. Eliz. 262 (1591).
32. 5 Harv. L. Rev. 84 (1891).
[Vol. 34:1
SELF-INCRIMINATION
requiring a person formally accused to answer pertaining to matter
within the jurisdiction of the court. All that can be safely asserted
is that the common lawyers both in the second half of the 13th and
all of the 14th century and under Henry VIII and Elizabeth re-
sisted the inquisitorial procedure of the spiritual courts, whether
Romish or English, and under Elizabeth began to base their oppo-
sition chiefly upon the principle that a person could not be com-
pelled to furnish under oath answers to charges which had not been
formally made and disclosed to him, except in causes testamentary
and matrimonial. No doubt, there was some confusion between the
attack on the power of the spiritual courts even to entertain certain
causes and its power to institute proceedings by the ex officio oath.
But there can equally be no doubt that to the common lawyers .a
system which required a person to furnish his own indictment from
his own lips under oath was repugnant to the law of the land.
But what of the situation where a defendant after proper accusa-
tion was brought to trial? A reading of the early cases in Howell's
State Trials makes it abundantly clear that both the judges in the
common law courts and the accused proceeded on the theory that
after pleading to the indictment, the accused could be asked and was
required to answer directly incriminating questions. But as early
as the 1640s, the accused began to claim, and the common law
judges to concede, that a man on trial could not be compelled to
answer 3 3 questions which would disclose his guilt. Freeborn John
Lilburn seems to have been largely responsible for the innovation.
After having been punished by the Star Chamber for his refusal to
take the ex officio oath, he appealed to the Commons, which in
1640 voted his sentence "illegal, and against the liberty of the sub-
ject," and ordered him to be compensated. 34 In the same year both
the Court of High Commission and the Court of Star Chamber
were abolished, and ecclesiastical officials and tribunals were for-
bidden to administer any ex officio oath by which a man should be
required to confess anything which would expose him to any
censure, pain, penalty or punishment whatsoever.3 In 1645 the
House of Lords heard the petition of Lilburn and ordered his sen-
tence to be totally vacated as "illegal, most unjust, and against the
liberty of the subject, and law of the land, and MIagna Charta, and
unfit to continue upon record, &c.",31 and in 1648 Lilburn was
33. See 8 Wig. op. cit. supra note 1, § 2250, n. 102, 103, 104.
34. 3 How. St. Tr. 1342 (1640). (The spelling of the name "Lilburn"
varies in the Reports.)
35. 5 Statutes of the Realm 110-113.
36. 3 How. St. Tr. 1368 (1638).
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granted £3000 in reparation.3 7 While this case had to do only with
the ex officio oath, the illegality of the procedure was declared to
consist of its violation of the liberty of the subject, the law of the
land and Magna Charta. In 1641 at the Trial of the Twelve Bishops,
they declined to answer whether they had signed the treasonable
petition, for the reason that they were not bound to accuse them-
selves.38 Thus they used the language that Coke in the King's Bench
had used without qualification in his opinions in the case of Bur-
rowes and others against the High Commission Court while citing
the decisions during Elizabeth's reign. In 1649 Lilburn was again
on trial, this time for treason against the Commonwealth. While
Lilburn was arguing that he should have counsel before being re-
quired to plead, he said to this effect: "Then, Sir, thus, by the Laws
of England, I am not to answer to questions against or concerning
myself." Lord Keble replied: "You shall not be compelled.",," And
when Penn and Mead were tried in 1670 for tumultuous assembly,
Mead was asked whether he was present when Penn was speaking
to the crowd. He replied: "It is a maxim in your own law, 'Nemo
tenetur accusare seipsum', which if it be not true Latin, I am sure
it is true English, 'That no man is bound to accuse himself.' And why
dost thou offer to insnare me with such a question ?" The recorder
answered: "Sir, hold your tongue, I did not go about to insnare
you. °40 In 1679 there are several cases where a witness is protected
against incriminating answers.41
Thus it seems that beginning with 1641 the common law courts
were at least occasionally applying to their own procedure at the
trial the prohibition which they had previously placed upon the pro-
cedure of the church courts before formal accusation. Because these
decisions followed so closely upon the abolition of the High Com-
mission and the Star Chamber, Wigmore accepts Bentham's ex-
planation that the reception of the maxim as generally applicable
was due to the tendency to condemn generally anything and every-
thing in the procedure of the ecclesiastical courts which affected
the liberties of the subject. In sweeping away these hated tribunals,
everything loosely thought of as characteristic of them had to go
too. This may be good enough a guess, but it may also be suggested
that, though in the recorded cases before the church courts these
extraordinarily acute defendants made nice distinctions between
37. Ibid.
38. 4 How. St. Tr. 63, 76 (1641).
39. Id. at 1292-1293.
40. 6 How. St. Tr. 951, 957-958 (1670).
41. See 8 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 1, § 2250, n. 104.
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being compelled to answer formal accusations and being made the
subjects of fishing expeditions the purpose of which was to uncover
heresies of themselves or their friends, the mass of the people who
were affected made no such fine discriminations and thought of the
principle as generally applicable. The references to the law of the
land and Magna Charta indicate reliance upon rules applicable to
all representatives of the Crown, whether ecclesiastical or temporal.
And Coke's frequent citation of the maxim without limitation must
have fostered this idea in the profession as well as among laymen.
Whatever the explanation, the rule becomes established by 1700 as
applicable to both defendants and witnesses in criminal trials in
the common law courts.
As stated above, in 1658 when the Attorney General sought
discovery in the Exchequer against Mico, 42 where defendant was
charged with avoiding customs duties and bribing customs officers,
defendant's counsel cited Coke and the cases in which Coke claimed
that the decision was based on the privilege. In 1682 the equity court
held good a plea to a bill for discovery "in order to the plaintiff's
bringing an action on the case for damages" done by defendant's
causing plaintiff's wines to be seized as French wines and thereafter
relinquishing the prosecution. The plea was based on a statute im-
posing a penalty upon anyone guilty of such conduct. 43 In 1737
Lord Hardwicke in denying discovery in an action for rents and
profits said that "there is no rule more established in equity than
that a person shall not be obliged to discover what will subject him
to a penalty or anything in the nature of a penalty.
"Under the rule, a man is not obliged to accuse himself, is im-
plied that he is not to discover a disability in himself; . . ." A
little earlier he had recognized the applicability of the privilege,45
and in later cases he treated it as established.46 Although the refusal
of the equity courts to grant discovery in these cases might have
been based on supposed grounds of fairness and reluctance to re-
quire or even permit one to allege his own turpitude, it seems fair
to conclude that by the middle of the eighteenth century they were
giving full recognition to the privilege. The scarcity or non-exist-
ence of reported cases in which the privilege was applied in civil
actions at common law may be explained by the fact that from the
42. See note 29 supra.
43. Bird v. Hardwicke, 1 Vern. 109 (1682).
44. Smith v. Read, 1 Atk. 526, 527 (1737).
45. Duncalf v. Blake, 1 Atk. 52 (1737).
46. Baker v. Pritchard, 2 Atk. 387 (1742); Harrison v. Southcote,
1 Atk. 528, 2 Vesey 389 (1751).
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early 1600s to the middle of the nineteenth century parties were dis-
qualified as witnesses and so, at least after the middle of the 1600s,
were interested persons.4 7 Furthermore when the common law
courts granted the privilege to witnesses in criminal proceedings,
it is highly improbable that they would have denied it to witnesses in
civil actions.
It may, therefore, be fairly stated that before the middle of the
1700s a man could not be required in England to accuse himself
on oath in any proceeding before an official tribunal seeking in-
formation looking to a criminal prosecution, or before a magistrate
investigating an accusation against him with or without oath, or
under oath in a court of equity or under oath in a court of common
law.
Did the privilege have more far-reaching operations? For
answer we must look to other aspects of criminal procedure. First,
the arraignment of the accused. He was required to identify himself
by holding up his right hand or by expressly admitting that he was
the person charged. Then he was asked whether he pleaded guilty or
not guilty. After a plea of not guilty, he was asked how he would
be tried and was expected to answer, "By God and my country."
If he refused to plead or to give the required answer after pleading,
and there was no question that he was physically and mentally
able to speak, the penalty for his recalcitrance depended upon the
grade of the offense of which he was accused. If treason or mis-
demeanor, he was treated as if he had pleaded guilty and was sub-
ject to the prescribed punishment. If felony, he could not be tried
or convicted unless he pleaded, and, if his plea was not guilty, put
himself upon the country. But his refusal to do so brought upon him
the penalty of peine forte et dure.48 The early penalty was prison
forte et dure, which consisted of close confinement with a meagre
allowance of bread on one day and of water on the next until con-
sent to plead or death from starvation followed. Peine was later
added to the confinement. There are recorded instances of its use
in the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. "" Coke described
it, as it was in the reign of James 1.50 At the Trial of Richard Weston
47. 2 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 1, § 575.
48. See 1 Pike, A History of Crime in England, 210-211, 387 (1873);
2 id. at 194-195 and 283-285 (1876); 1 Stephen, History of Criminal Law
297-301 (1883); Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence 70-81 (1898)
2 Hale, Pleas of the Crown, 314-321 (ed. of 1800).
49. Thayer, op. cit. supra note 48, at 75-77.
50. 2 How. St. Tr. 911, 914 (1615).
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in 1615, charged with the murder of Sir Thomas Overbury, in
urging Weston to put himself upon the country, Coke
"repeated the form of judgment given against such, (as refused to
do so) the extremity and rigour whereof was expressed in these
words, onere, frigore et fame. For the first, he was to receive his
punishment by the law, to be extended, and then to have weights
laid upon him, no more than he was able to bear, which were by
little and little to be increased.
"For the second, that he was to be exposed in an open place,
near to the prison, in the open air, being naked.
"And lastly, that he was to be preserved with the coarsest bread
that could be got, and water out of the next sink or puddle to the
place of execution, and that day he had water he should have no
bread, and that day he had bread he should have no water; and in
this torment he was to linger as long as nature could linger out, so
that oftentimes men lived in that extremity eight or nine days:
adding further, that as life left him, so judgment should find him."
Major Strangeway's Case in 1658 is a striking example. By this
time it seems that in order to hasten the death of the victim a sharp
stake or piece of wood was ordinarily placed under him. In Strange-
way's case this was not done, but a part of the heavy weight was
put over his heart and the attendants stood upon it, so that he
died within a few minutes.5 1 In 1726 Burnworth -5 2 refused to plead
and was pressed for an hour and three quarters. The torture of
bearing nearly four hundred pounds induced him to consent to
plead not guilty. He was found guilty by a jury, and was hanged.
According to the report of Chief Justice Kelyng, George Thorely
at the Newgate sessions in October, 1664, refused to plead and
"his two thumbs were tied together with whipcord, that the pain of
that might compel him to plead, and he was sent away so tied, and
a minister persuaded to go to him to persuade him; and an hour
after he was brought again and pleaded. And this was said to
be the constant practice at Newgate."5 3 This was used as a prelimi-
nary to pressing in Burnworth's Case, and in 1734 it, combined
with threats of pressing, induced John Durant to plead not guilty.5
Not until 1772 was this barbaric practice abolished; the statute
of 12 Geo. III provided that if a person stood mute on his arraign-
ment of piracy or felony, he should be convicted and the court
should award judgment and execution as if he had been convicted
51. 2 Pike, op. cit. supra note 48. at 194.
52. Id. at 283-284.
53. J. Kelyng 27 (1708). The spelling and capitalization are modernized.
Thayer gives the name of the accused as Harley. Thayer, op. cit. supra note
48, at 77.
54. 2 Pike, op. cit. mipra note 48, at 284-285, 638.
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by verdict or confession. In 1827 standing mute in any criminal
case was by statute of 7 and 8 Geo. IV made the equivalent of a
plea of not guilty.55
Next, the preliminary hearing. Statutes enacted in 1554 and
1555, provided that when any person arrested for manslaughter
or felony or suspicion thereof was brought before two justices of
the peace, they should examine him and the persons who brought
him concerning the fact and circumstances, and have put in writ-
ing so much of the examinations as was material to prove the
offense5 6 It seems reasonably clear from the records in Howell's
State Trials that a justice of the peace who had learned that a
crime had been committed, frequently before any arrest had been
made examined, on his own initiative, persons who he believed
had information concerning it and the person whom he suspected
of having committed it. The questions were directed to the particu-
lar offense, and the answers given often led to the arrest of the
person questioned. Two justices conducted the formal examination
after arrest. There was no thought of advising the accused that he
need not answer or warning him that what he said might be used
against him. The justice was often the chief witness at the trial of
the accused and either used his record of the examination as the
basis for his answers or read the record in evidence for the prosecu-
tion.5 7 It was not until the enactment of Sir John Jervis's Act in
1848 that the accused was given protection at the preliminary hear-
ing. By its terms he had the right to be present at the examination
of the witnesses and to cross-examine them; he was not to be
questioned but was permitted to make a statement after being
warned that he need say nothing and that whatever he said would
be recorded and might be given in evidence against him.58
Finally, as to confessions obtained by coercion. While all the
English commentators insist that the law of England has always
forbidden the use of torture to secure a confession and that this was
specifically so declared in the answer of all the judges to the King
in Felton's Case,"9 there can be no doubt that by direction of the
Crown or by order of the Privy Council, torture was frequently
55. See Thayer, op. cit. supra note 48, at 78 n. 1; 1 Holdsworth,
History of English Law 327 (6 ed. 1938).
56. Statutes of 1 and 2 Ph. & M. c. 13 and of 2 and 3 Ph. & M. c. 10.
57. See Trial of Col. Turner and others, 6 How. St. Tr. 565, 572-576,
617-619 (1664) ; Trial of George Borosky and others, 9 id. at 1, 22-27, 120-123
(1682). (This case is ordinarily known as the Trial of Count Coningsmark.)
58. See 1 Stephen, op. cit. supra note 48, at 216-225.
59. Jardine, Use of Torture in the Criminal Law of England 6-12
(1837), (hereafter referred to as Jardine).
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used in the reigns of Edward VI, Mary, Elizabeth, James I and
Charles I, and confessions thereby obtained were made the basis
of convictions. MacNally quotes from "King James's Premonition"
a statement that torture "was never used but in cases of high trea-
son, '"" but Jardine gives instances of its having been ordered in
cases of murder, robbery, embezzlement, horse stealing and some
unspecified offenses. He found no case of torture after 1640; but
in the Trial of Thomas Tonge61 for high treason in 1662 Sir
Orlando Bridgman told Tonge that he had against him four wit-
nesses and his own examination and confession. Tonge replied, "I
confess I did confess it in the tower, being threatened with the
rack."
It will be remembered that beginning with the Collier Case,
Coke insisted that no one should be compelled to accuse himself.
It is interesting to note that the Privy Council in December, 1596,
and February, 1597, addressed a letter to Coke, Francis Bacon
and two others directing them to use in the one case "manackles and
torture" and in the other "manacles or the torture of the racke" to
force certain prisoners to tell the truth about the circumstances of
the offenses with which they were charged and particularly the
identity of others involved.62 In 1603, a mandate addressed to Coke
and others required them to examine one Phillip Maye, and "if
he shall not deale playnly and truly to discover the depth of his
knowledge, mynde, and conference in all these matters, then you
shall by virtue hereof put him to the manacles, or such other
torture as is used in the Tower, that he may be inforced to reveale
the uttermost of his knowledge in any practise, purpose, or intent
against His Highness. '6 3 As to this, Jardine says: "The circum-
stances that this examination bears date the same day as the war-
rant,-that it is executed and signed by the same persons to whom
the warrant is directed, and that the whole of it is in the hand-
writing of the Attorney-general, furnish convincing evidence that
this was one of those instances in which Sir Edward Coke per-
sonally conducted an examination by torture. '0 4
Tonge's Case indicates that there was no disposition to reject
a confession obtained by threats of torture as late as 1662; and
there seems to be no indication in the reported trials of objections
to confessions on the ground that they were improperly obtained
60. MacNally, Rules of Evidence on Pleas of the Crown 276 (1802).
61. 6 How. St. Tr. 225, 259 (1662).
62. Jardine, No. 44, p. 99; No. 45, p. 100.
63. Id. No. 50, p. 105.
64. Id. at 46-47.
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until about the middle of the eighteenth century. At the Trial of
Francis Francia65 in 1717, the defendant insisted that Lord Town-
shend had paid him five guineas to induce him to sign the state-
ment offered against him and that one Buckley, whom Lord Town-
shend had sent to him in prison, told him that he must swear for the
government right or wrong if he would avoid punishment for high
treason. There is no indication that even had this been the truth,
it would have had any effect except upon the weight to be given to
the confession. That the accused at times had the advice of friends
not to answer harmful questions at the preliminary hearing appears
as early as 1729 in the Trial of William Hales and Thomas Kin-
nersley8 for forgery. But evidence of this incident was received
without objection. In 1741 when Matthew Mahony was on trial in
Bristol for the murder of Sir John Goodere, 67 his examination
taken before the Mayor was offered in evidence. Thereupon the
following occurred.
Q. Did you see the prisoner Mahony sign it in his (the Mayor's)
presence?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Did he do it voluntarily?
A. lie did.
Q. Did you see Mr. Mayor sign that examination?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Then I desire it may be read.
Mr. Recorder: Read the Examination.
Charles White was tried separately for the same murder. When
his examination before the mayor was offered, the question, whether
he had signed it voluntarily, was not asked, whereupon counsel for
White said:
"It is opened by Mr. Vernon, that this Examination contains
65. 15 How. St. Tr. 897, 917, 919, 985, 986 (1717). See also Trial of
Edward Arnold, 16 id. at 695, 714, 758 (1724), where the magistrate testified
that he got a statement from the accused only with a great deal of difficulty
and persuasion.
66. 17 How. St. Tr. 229, 235 (1727) ; id. at 267, 273. In the first case
the magistrate testified that after Kinnersley had answered some questions
with reference to one note, he "seemed ready to make an ample confession"
but was stopped by "a person there." The magistrate thought this not
becoming. In the second case, one Mitford told the accused to say nothing
about the second note.
67. 17 Id. at 1003, 1053 (1741). (The names of the examiner and
witness are omitted.)
68. Id. at 1079, 1085.
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the prisoner's confession of the fact. I would ask Mr. Britten, was
the confession voluntarily made or not? For if it was not voluntarily,
it ought not to be read."
"Mr. Recorder. That is an improper question, unless the
prisoner had insisted, and made it part of his case, that his con-
fession was extorted by threats, or drawn from him by promises; in
that case, indeed, it would have been proper for us to enquire by
what means the confession was procured: but as the prisoner alleges
nothing of that kind, I will not suffer a question to be asked the
clerk, which carries in it a reflection on the magistrate before whom
the Examination was taken. Let it be read."
In Rudd's Case" in 1775, on application for release on bail,
counsel argued that the prisoner had been induced by "promises and
assurances to answer to an examination, and to swear to it on
oath." In holding the objection irrelevant Lord Mansfield said:
"The instance has frequently happened, of persons having made
confessions under threats or promises: the consequence as fre-
quently has been, that such examination and confessions have not
been made use of against them on their trial." Eight years later
the accused argued that an offer in evidence of property found
as the result of a confession obtained by promises should be re-
jected, "for otherwise the faith which the prosecutor had pledged
would be violated. ' 70 The court answered that this idea was novel
and repugnant to the general principles of the criminal law, that the
admissibility of confessions depended on whether they were entitled
to credit. "A free and voluntary confession is deserving of the
highest credit, . . .but a confession forced from the mind by the
flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear, comes in so questionable
a shape when it is to be considered as the evidence of guilt, that
no credit ought to be given to it; and therefore it is rejected."' 71
From this review of the English authorities the following con-
clusions, it is submitted, may be fairly drawn.
1. At no time from the end of the fifteenth century to the com-
mencement of the nineteenth century was there any notion that an
accused had a privilege not to plead at his arraignment for trial
for any criminal offense. He was either subject to torture to com-
pel him to plead or subject to punishment as upon a plea of guilty
or conviction by a jury.
69. Leach's Crown Cas. 115, 117-18 (4th ed. 1775).
70. Warickshall's Case, id. at 263 (1783).
71. Id. at 263-264. The cases cited in these notes 67-71 are all to be
found in Wigmore's discussion in §§ 818 and 819. His deductions from them
and some of the earlier authorities are somewhat different from those in
the text.
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2. From the middle of the sixteenth century to the middle of
the nineteenth, the accused was subject to a preliminary examina-
tion before committing magistrates and expected to answer. He
was not warned that he need not answer; and, indeed, any refusal
to answer, whether of his own initiative or on advice of another,
was reported and stated by the magistrate in his testimony at the
trial.
3. Up to the middle of the seventeenth century torture was used
to extort confessions, and there was no serious contention that
such extorted confessions were inadmissible against the victim.
Even Coke, the great advocate of the applicability of the privilege
against self-incrimination to proceedings in the common law courts
seems never to have regarded it as having any application to ex-
torted confessions or to proceedings before the committing
magistrates.
4. As early as the second decade of the eighteenth century, the
accused were making objections to the use of confessions secured by'
threats or promises by persons in authority. It is not clear whether
the objection went only to the weight of such evidence. By 1741 the
idea that such a confession ought not to be received over the objec-
tion of the accused pretty clearly appears in the Cases of Mahony
and White. 12 Certainly the Recorder's ready statement as to the
effect of threats or promises indicates an accepted rule rather than a
novelty; and Lord Mansfield's dictum some thirty years later de-
clares the rejection of the evidence to be as frequent as the use of
the improper means to secure it. By 1783 not only is the rule
recognized but there is debate as to the theory on which evidence
of the confession is rejected. But there is nothing in the reports
to suggest that the theory has its roots in the privilege against self-
incrimination. And so far as the cases reveal, the privilege, as such,
seems to have been given effect only in judicial proceedings, in-
cluding the preliminary examinations by authorized magistrates.
B. In the Colonies
The available colonial precedents are few, and only tentative
conclusions are warranted. It would have been strange if the
Colonists had not brought to America the ideas and ideals which
they had cherished in England. As to torture, condemnation of its
use to compel a confession appears in the Massachusetts Body of
Liberties of 1641 ; and it seems clear that it was not sanctioned (or
72. See notes 67 and 68 supra.
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used in the Colonies) after it had disappeared in the mother
country.7
3
To the preliminary examination of an accused by the committing
magistrates there appears to have been no objection. The English
Colonists must have been familiar with its use as provided for in
the statute of William and Mary, for it was an everyday occurrence,
and no one thought of challenging its validity. In like manner it was
common practice for the court at the trial to question and even
argue with the accused. The conduct of the Massachusetts judges
in this respect in the Trials of Anne Hutchinson and John Wheel-
wright in 163774 could not have been regarded as extraordinary.
And the keen and doughty defendants were not one whit less
skillful than the best of their prototypes in similar situations in
England. They insisted on knowing who were their accusers and
what were the charges against them. When Wheelwright was told
that these ordinary requisites were not necessary in his case because
the questions concerned a sermon which he acknowledged and the
court might therefore proceed "ex officio," "great exception was
taken, as if the Court intended the course of the High Commission,
&c. It was answered that the word ex officio was very safe and
proper .... seeing the Court did not examine him by any com-
pulsory meanes, as by oath, imprisonment, or the like. . . ." Again,
after he had consented to be questioned, when he was asked about
a matter not directly connected with the sermon, and he refused
to answer, "some cried out, that the Court went about to ensnare
him, and to make him to accuse himself .... ,,75
It is likewise reasonably clear that the English procedure for
73. See Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privi-
l.qe Against Self-Incrimination in America, 21 Va. L. Rev. 763, 775-783(1935). The exception in § 45 of the Mass. Body of Liberties dealt with
torture to compel a convict to disclose his confederates where their exis-
tence was very apparent. For many helpful suggestions and references deal-
ing with the law in the Colonies, I am indebted to my colleague, Professor
Mark Howe.
74. See 1 Chandler's Criminal Trials 3 (1841).
75. Antinomianism in the Colony of Massachusetts Bay, 1636-1638,
Edited by Charles Frances Adams, 194, 195 (Boston, 1894). There can be
little doubt that the struggle of Englishmen against extorting confessions by
oath ex officio or by torture was being duplicated in America. See the
answers of all three ministers in 1642 to the questions submitted by Belling-
ham to Governor Winthrop and by him referred to the ministers. 3 Massa-
chusetts Historical Society Collections 389-397 (4th series, 1856). It is diffi-
cult to imagine how Wigmore in his third edition could cite these letters as
supporting his statement (8 Wigmore, p. 301), that as late as 1685 the
Colonies "formally sanctioned the ecclesiastical rule by which the inquisitional
oath was allowed," especially since he was obviously familiar with Mr.
Pittman's article in which the contrary was demonstrated by direct quo-
tation.
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compelling an accused, charged with a felony other than treason,
to plead and put himself upon the country was recognized in the
Colonies. In 1639 Dorothy Talbye "was so possessed with Satan,
that he persuaded her ... to break the neck of her own child, that
she might free it from future misery. This she confessed upon her
apprehension; yet, at her arraignment, she stood mute a good
space, till the governour told her she would be pressed to death,
and then she confessed the indictment."76 In 1692 Giles Corey
charged with witchcraft pleaded not guilty; but, because he had
seen the juries convict all others so charged, he refused to put him-
self upon the country. He was pressed to death.7 7
Goebel and Naughton 7  think that peine forte did not become
a part of the law of New York because the judges in the Case of
Jacob Leisler "saw fit to employ a modification of it on that un-
happy man, and this one experience with the great mercies of the
peine was sufficient." They quote from the record, showing that
the president of the court advised him to plead; when he refused
and asked leave to consult counsel, the prosecutor prayed judg-
ment. Leisler was then "ordered tyed up and putt in irons in order
to his suffering the Judgmt of the law to be given by this court...."
There is nothing to indicate the meaning of "tyed up." It is clear,
however, that this harsh treatment was not continued; and cer-
tainly there was no need of it to induce a plea, for Leisler was
charged with treason, and refusal to plead to either treason or
misdemeanor was the equivalent of a plea of guilty. The contem-
porary records make it clear that both Leisler and Milbourne con-
tinued to stand mute and were convicted as mutes.70 Consequently
76. 1 Winthrop, History of New England 297, *336 (ed. of 1853).
77. Burr, Narratives of the Witchcraft Cases 367, 393 (1914). This
portion of the book reprints material from More Wonders of the Invisible
World by Robert Calef printed in London in 1700. Calef asserts: "In press-
ing his Tongue being prest out of his Mouth, the Sheriff with his Cane
forced it in again, when he was dying. He was the first in New-England
that was ever prest to Death." Calef's book was called "A Volumn of
invented and notorious lies" by Cotton Mather before it was sent to London
to be printed. When it appeared, President Increase Mather "ordered the
wicked book to be burnt in the college yard."
78. Law Enforcement in Colonial New York 582 (1944).
79. 2 Documentary History of New York 381, 382, 386, 425, 434 (ar-
ranged under the direction of the Hon. Christopher Morgan, Secretary of
State, by E. B. O'Callaghan, Albany, 1849). ". . . the Major . . . brought
Leisler and his Councell. to the Govr. at the Citty hall they being taken in
actuall rebellion the Govr .... ordered a Commission of Oyer & Terminer
to be Issued out for their Legall tryall where two were acquitted by their
country viz: Delanoy & Edsall, six Convict by their Countrey, and two
Leslier & Millbourn Condemned as mute. . . ." A similar statement is made
by Major Ingoldsby & Council to the Lords of Trade under date of July
29, 1691. And in A Letter from A Gentleman of the City of New York To
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if Leisler was treated any differently from the ordinary prisoner
convicted of treason and awaiting sentence, and the the treatment
was to induce him to take the benefit of a trial by jury, this
"modified pehic" may have been in the nature of a favor. More-
over, the authors report the Case of Elizabeth Horton in 1723
wherein the usual English procedure was followed. She stood
mute and a jury was empanelled to determine whether she stood
mute through obstinacy or malice or as a result of Divine visitation.
The jury found that she was mad both then and at the time of the
offense.' 0
Whether Maryland accepted this procedure is not clear. There
is a record of conviction in 1668 of an Indian and a negro upon
their standing mute. The Indian was convicted of murder; and
the negro for killing his mistress. This latter was petit treason.
An Act of 1737 talks of conviction by standing mute. In 1809 a
statute directed the courts to proceed to trial of persons standing
mute as if they had pleaded not guilty81 In the absence of further
evidence, it might well be concluded that until 1809 an accused
who refused to plead was treated no better in Maryland than in
England.
That the English practice was regarded as generally applicable
in the absence of legislation is a reasonable deduction from United
States v. Hare.'- Upon arraignment on an indictment for robbery
of the mail by use of dangerous weapons-an offense punishable
by death-defendants refused to plead. The argument of counsel
was directed to the question whether the court must follow the
English law as it was before the statute of 12 Geo. III, and order
an inquest by jury as to whether defendants stood mute ex visita-
tione Dci or c.r ialitio. The Court held that (a) the Act of Con-
gress of 1790,' in so far as it provided that if defendant stood mute
Another, printed in pamphlet form in 1698 it is said concerning Leisler and
Milborne: "After several hearings as mutes, [they] were found guilty of
High Treason and Murder & executed Accordingly." Governor Sloughter
under date of May 7, 1691, forwarded with his approval a report of the
Leisler affair in which the following occurs: "Leyseler and Milborne did
shew great stubbornes uppon their arraignment and were mute; whereupon
they were condemned." See 3 Documents Relating to the Colonial History of
the State of New York 762, 766 (1853).
80. Goebel and Naughton, op. cit. supra note 78, at 583.
81. See Kilty, English Statutes (applicable in 'aryland), 17 (1811).
This is in comment on the inapplicability of Chap. 12 of the Statute of
Westminster I.
82. Fed. Cas. No. 15.304, 2 Wheeler Cr. Cas. 283 (D. Md., 1818). The
act of 1790 was not by its terms applicable to the case at bar.
83. "An Act for the Punishment of certain Crimes against the United
States," 1 Stat. 112.
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when arraigned for an offense punishable by death, trial should
proceed as if he had pleaded not guilty, and (b) other federal
statutes, and (c) the whole structure of federal criminal law, were
persuasive that the English rule was not applicable; and if the
Maryland rule was to apply, the precedents indicated that standing
mute was the equivalent of a conviction before the statute of 1809.
As late as 1881, a defendant standing mute on arraignment on an
information for mailing a lottery circular, seriously insisted that the
judge had no authority to enter a plea of not guilty for him. The
court followed the Hare case, and said that there was no distinction
between an accusation by indictment and one by information .
4
It should be noted that neither in England, nor in the Colonies,
nor in these federal cases is there any contention or intimination
that either the common law procedure for compelling a plea or the
statutory substitute in any way impinges upon the privilege against
self-incrimination. But in this connection it is interesting to observe
that in Massachusetts as early as 1642 the relation between com-
pelling answers by torture or by the oath ex officio and the maxim,
"Nemo tenetur prodere seipsum" was appreciated.8
The Colonial cases, like those in England, involved only official
inquiries by magistrates and actual trials. In such situations the
privilege against self-incrimination must have been firmly estab-
lished in most of the Colonies before 1789, for six of them had em-
bodied it in their fundamental laws."6 The Maryland provision of
1776 was so qualified that it could be practically nullified by the
legislature.17 The New York Constitution of 1777 contained no
bill or declaration of rights. Goebel and Naughton, after describing
the procedure in cases where improperly induced confessions were
admitted and where the court questioned the accused without any
warning or apparently any recognition of a right to refuse to answer
incriminating questions, declare that "the conclusion is inescapable
that so far as New York Province was concerned there was no at-
tempt made to privilege a defendant or to treat his testimony as in-
competent. . . . This indifference to any privilege against self-
84. United States v. Borger, 7 Fed. 193 (S.D. N.Y., 1881).
85. See the letters referred to in note 75 supra. Bellingham's question
was, "How farr a magistrate may extracte a confession from a delinquente,
to accuse him selfe of a capitall crime, seeing Nemo tenetur prodere seipsum."
3 Mass. Hist. Soc. Collections 390 (4th series 1833) ; cf. Id. at 391 and 396.
86. These in chronological order were Virginia, Pennsylvania, North
Carolina, Vermont. Massachusetts, and New Hampshire. See respectively 2
Poore, United States Charters and Constitutions 1909, 1541-1542, 1409, 1860,
1 H. at 958, 2 id. at 1282 (2d ed. 1878).
87. 1 Id. at 818.
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incrimination probably embraced witnesses generally although we
have found but one case.... Whatever may be the colonial back-
ground of the later constitutional protection, it derives, as far as
New York is concerned, from a very tardy realization that such
protection was desirable."" But when New York ratified the United
States Constitution, it proposed an amendment which among other
things provided that in all criminal prosecution the accused should
not be compelled to give evidence against himself.89 Does this sug-
gest that the conclusion of our authors may be escapable, and that
the New York Colonial precedents, like the English, indicate only
that there was no necessity of informing an accused of his right not
to answer incriminating questions, and cannot be regarded as
decisions that he could be compelled to answer under oath or by
torture? Rhode Island proposed an amendment similar to that
of New York, and it would be rash to infer that she did not recog-
nize the privilege simply because it was not first definitely made
a fundamental law until 1846.90 Although Connecticut had no
constitutional provision until 1818, early Colonial statutes forbade
the use of torture to force a confession of crime.9' And while there
seems to have been a general tendency to confuse the privilege
with the prohibition of torture, the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution specifically covered the privilege.
The language of the Constitutional provisions is not as broad as
the English precedents would have warranted. In six of the
Colonial Constitutions preceding 1789 the provision forbade com-
pelling a person to give evidence against himself in criminal
prosecutions; in Maryland the prohibition applied "in a common
court of law or in any other court." The Fifth Amendment prohibits
compelling him to be a witness against himself in any criminal case.
If this language were to be construed as fixing the limits of the
privilege without regard to the existing precedents, it would be
difficult to contend that it could be legitimately claimed in a civil
action in law or equity, or in any proceeding which was not to be
used as a foundation for a criminal prosecution.
88. Goebel and Naughton, op. cit. supra note 78, at 659. The first New
York constitutional provision against self-incrimination is found in section
6 of Article I of the Constitution of 1846. It copies the pertinent language
from the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 2 Poore, op.
cit. supra note 86, at 1351.
89. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 109 (1908).
90. See ibid. Delaware had no constitutional prohibition against self-
incrimination until 1792; South Carolina and Georgia until after the Civil
War; New Jersey still has none.
91. See Pittman, op. cit. supra note 73, at 779, 781.
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II. SOME CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
A. Withdrawn Plea of Guilty
Even during the period when the accused was compelled to
plead to escape death by torture or judgment of conviction, a
judicial confession would not be entered of record as a plea of
guilty if the court believed it to be the result of duress or to be due
to a mistake as to the legal effect of admitted conduct. And where
a defendant stated the facts for the advice of the court, even though
they constituted the commission of a felony, he might be per-
mitted to plead not guilty and put himself upon the country. 2
There is no indication in the early treatise of Hale (1680) or that
of Hawkins (1716), both of whom accept the authority of Staund-
ford, as to whether the jury was informed of the confession or
statement of the accused. Certainly there is not the slightest sugges-
tion or intimation that the conduct of the accused upon his arraign-
men ought not to be made known to the jury or that the privilege
against self-incrimination had any application. Nothing can be
clearer than that an accused's refusal to plead to a charge of mis-
demeanor or treason furnished the basis for an inference of guilt,
and indeed, a conclusive inference. And there was no hesitation
in using torture to force a plea from him where the charge was
felony. A plea of guilty would have been as welcome as a plea
of not guilty, probably more welcome, for not only did the accused
have to plead, but where he pleaded not guilty, he had also to put
himself upon the country. And there is not even the remotest
intimation that the 19th century legislation, which made standing
mute upon arraignment on any charge the equivalent of a plea
of guilty, was an encroachment upon the privilege against self-
incrimination.
The conduct of criminal trials in England in the 17th and 18th
centuries with the numerous colloquies between the court and the
accused, and the settled practice of receiving against the accused
his admissions and confessions made to the examining magistrates
(see 3 Wig. § 848) demonstrate that, while the accused could not be
compelled to answer criminating questions, he had no right to be
warned that he need not answer, and his answers were constantly
and consistently used against him. Of course, he was incompetent
as a witness; but his incompetency was not grounded upon the
privilege against self-incrimination, nor did the interpretation put
upon his conduct at arraignment have any relation to the privilege.
92. Staundford, Pleas of the Crown, book 2, c. 51 (1567).
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It was not until 1942 that any connection between the privilege and
the plea at arraignment was judicially recognized. 93 Mr. Justice
Rutledge, speaking for the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia, felt called upon to justify the decision of the Supreme
Court in the Kercheval case9" upon a ground which had never
occurred to that august tribunal. It had held evidence of a with-
drawn plea of guilty inadmissible because its use against defendant
at the trial would be inconsistent with the judge's determination
that defendant was entitled to a trial. Judge Swan's reasoning,
that since the judge had found it unfair to hold the accused to his
plea of guilty, it would be equally unfair to use it against him as an
admission," was deemed likewise superficial. The real reason was
that to make such use of it would violate his privilege against self-
incrimination. While the court has unquestioned power to demand
that defendant plead, "the plea is not evidence.... When it is 'not
guilty', it has no effect as testimony or as evidence in behalf of the
accused. If he wishes his denial to be effective as evidence, he must
make it as such from the witness stand." 96 True enough, but what
has all this to do with privilege against self-incrimination? It may
be that if the plea of "not guilty" is not evidence for the defendant,
a plea of guilty ought not be evidence for the prosecution. But
this notion of reciprocity or mutuality, if applied generally, would
exclude all admissions and confessions for the reason that self-
serving statements by a party to the action are everywhere rejected
when offered in his behalf. "What is more to the point, the plea
is not demanded or made with intention that it be testimonial
or evidentiary. It is rather a formal criminal pleading, a waiver of
trial and defense, a submission without contest. It does not create,
it dispenses with evidence. Too often in minor offenses, and perhaps
occasionally in major ones, it is made to avoid contest.' 7 Hitherto,
it has never been supposed that an admission was inadmissible
against the admitter because he did not realize that it might later
perform the function of evidence or might be used as evidence
against him. Though such a consideration may be pertinent to a
declaration against interest, it has no application to an admission.
Indeed, a statement that was highly self-serving when made is
receivable in evidence against the party making it wherever rele-
-vant. As to pleading guilty "to avoid contest," if this refers to a
93. Wood v. United States, 128 F. 2d 265 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
4. Kercheval v. United States, 274 U. S. 220 (1927).
95. United States v. Adelman, 107 F. 2d 497, 499 (2d Cir. 1939).
96. Wood v. United States, 128 F. 2d 265, 273 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
97. Id. at 273, 274.
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compromise, the evidence may be inadmissible if there is a public
policy to encourage compromises with persons charged with crime,
or if the offer to compromise is considered not as a statement of a
fact but merely as a conditional concession.
If the plea is to be used as evidence, then the court has no power
to demand it. "The demand forces the defendant to commit himself
squarely on the issue of his guilt.. .. There is no room to hedge
or dodge. Standing mute in legal effect pleads not guilty. But as
evidence it would carry the danger of silence when innocence re-
quires speech."' g Of course, that was exactly the effect of standing
mute to a charge of treason; and no English court ever dreamed
that this was a violation of the privilege. But just how is the de-
fendant forced to commit himself on the issue, if he may stand
mute? How can standing mute carry any danger when it is the
legal equivalent of a plea of not guilty? What defendant who pleads
guilty, otherwise than by way of compromise, ever supposes that he
is not saying that he did the act charged but is merely waiving
trial? And if any defendant has so pleaded with that understanding,
is it to be taken for granted that the same is true of all defendants?
Of course, the language of the Fifth Amendment can be construed
to cover a withdrawn plea of guilty or a plea of guilty at the pre-
liminary hearing which is repudiated at the trial. It can with equal
facility be construed as prohibiting no more than the calling of
defendant to the stand as a witness at the trial. But, heretofore, it
has been supposed that the words were to be interpreted reasonably
in view of accepted common law procedure.
The problem which Mr. justice Rutledge had to solve con-
cerned not a withdrawn plea of guilty but a plea of guilty before a
committing magistrate. He was confronted with the decision in
the Kercheval case and with a multitude of authorities holding
admissible evidence of a plea of guilty made to the committing
magistrate. 9 In order to disregard these cases and the opinions
distinguishing them from the Kercheval case, he turned to the
Constitutional privilege. One can sympathize with his dissatisfac-
tion with a rule that rejects a withdrawn plea of guilty made at
arraignment, where the accused is afforded every protection against
misunderstanding, and admits a repudiated plea of guilty made at
the preliminary hearing, where he may be without counsel and
where the effect of his action may not be fully explained to him. If
98. Id. at 274.
99. See the cases collected in 141 A. L. R. 1318, 1335 (1942) showing
almost uniform holdings in the absence of statutes.
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the object of a trial is the ascertainment of the truth, it is difficult
to see how either can be rejected. Perhaps under our adversary
system certain rules of good sportsmanship may be appropriate;
but certainly they should not by implication be written into the Con-
stitution by judicial decision at this late date.100
B. Confessions Coerced by Police
In his effort to explain the error of the courts in adopting the
generally accepted rule admitting evidence of a plea of guilty before
a committing magistrate, Mr. Justice Rutledge pointed out that
they had looked only to the rules governing admissibility of con-
fession and had neglected to consider the applicability of the
privilege. lVhile he overlooked some essential features of the his-
tory of the privilege and mistakenly analogized the examination of
the accused by ecclesiastical courts under the ex officio oath to the
examination without oath before committing magistrates, he laid
great emphasis upon the differences between the objective of the
privilege and that of the rule governing confessions. He implied, if
he did not expressly assert, that the chief, if not the sole, function
of the privilege is to stand guard "against the ancient abuse of
judicial inquisition," to protect "against the force of the court
itself." The rule regarding confessions "fills no need for checking
abuses of judicial inquisition." It excludes "untrustworthy com-
munications"; "protects against extrajudicial physical and moral
forces, applied where the privilege has no effect," and excludes
"evidence so squeezed out because it has no value as proof." The
privilege applies regardless of duress. It comes into play when the
question is asked. "It excludes response regardless of its probative
value." 101
The inference from his discussion and his citation of Wigmore0 2
is that the privilege has no application to inquisitions by the police.
If so, this is most unfortunate. The function which the police have
assumed in interrogating an accused is exactly that of the early
committing magistrates, and the opportunities for imposition and
abuse are fraught with much greater danger. As interpreted by
\Vigmore and by many, if not the majority, of state courts, the rule
excluding confessions applies only to statements conceding the
existence of all the elements of a punishable offense. It has no
100. Mr. Justice Rutledge adhered to his view in the Wood case, after
his elevation to the Supreme Court. See his dissenting opinion in Canizio
v. New York, 327 U. S. 82, 91 (1946).
101. Wood v. United States, 128 F. 2d 265, 268 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
102. 8 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 1, § 2266.
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effect to exclude coerced admissions of facts from which a trier might
reasonably find guilt. The privilege, on the other hand, covers state-
ments which disclose facts merely tending to show guilt. Investi-
effect to exclude coerced admissions of facts from which a trier might
gation by the police is not judicial, but when it consists of an
examination of an accused, it is quite as much an official proceeding
as the early English preliminary hearing before a magistrate, and it
has none of the safeguards of a judicial proceeding. If the historical
confines of the privilege are to be broadened, this surely is an area
that needs inclusion for reasons infinitely more compelling than
those applicable to the arraignment.
Only a year before the Wood case, a dictum of the same court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Edgerton, declared that the use of an
extorted confession violated the privilege as embodied in the Fifth
Amendment.'0 3 The opinions of state courts likewise reveal con-
flicting views.10 4 Unfortunately none of them gives the problem
thorough consideration. It mus be conceded that all of the decisions
admitting coerced statements of incriminating facts not amount-
ing to a confession assume that the privilege is inapplicable, as
does the constant recognition of the accepted police practice which,
in the absence of statute, does not require that the accused be
warned he need not answer in situations where, if the proceeding
were judicial, the accused need not testify at all. 0 5 On the other
hand, all the authorities dealing with the validity of statutes re-
quiring reports to the police and the keeping of records of various
occupational activities, as well as those passing upon the admis-
sibility of evidence obtained by physical and mental examination of
an accused by the police or under their direction, proceed upon the
theory that the constitutional privilege furnishes protection against
inquiries by the police. The conflict in the latter group arises from
differences of opinion as to whether the privilige is confined to
testimonial conduct; in the former, as to whether engaging in the
activity justifies the imposition of the applicable condition upon
103. Bullock v. United States, 122 F. 2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
104. People v. Fox, 319 IIl. 606, 150 N. E. 347 (1926) ; People v.
Owen, 154 Mich. 571, 118 N. W. 590 (1908) ; Owen v. Commonwealth, 186
Va. 689, 43 S. E. 2d 895, 898 (1947), agreeing with Wigmore. People v.
Simmons, 28 Cal. 2d 699, 716, 719, 720, 172 P. 2d 18 (1946); People v.
Shroyer, 336 Ill. 324, 168 N. E. 337 (1929) ; Matter of Schmidt v. District
Attorney, 255 App. Div. 353, 357, 8 N. Y. S. 2d 787 (4th Dep't 1938).
Contra: Abston v. State, 139 Tex. Cr. 416, 417, 141 S. W. 2d 337 (1940).
105. See, e.g., State ex rel. Poach v. Sly, 63 S. D. 162, 257 N. W. 113
(1934) ; State v. Allison, 116 Mont. 352, 153 P. 2d 141 (1944) ; O'Connell
v. United States, 40 F. 2d 201 (2d Cir. 1930).
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the privilege of so doing or constitutes a waiver of the consitutional
privilege. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has never
considered the privilege as confined to judicial investigations. 08
In the Prince case"1 7 the Massachusetts Court reversed a conviction
of a defendant charged with having refused, in violation of a statute
regulating the labor of minors, to give a school attendance officer
the name of a minor in defendant's custody who, in defendant's
presence, was offering a magazine for sale on a city street. Mr.
Justice Qua observed: "The supervisor of attendance was in effect
asking the defendant to help him secure the Commonwealth's
principal witness in order to prosecute the defendant. If the de-
fendant can be convicted for not answering such a question, why
could not a statute be enacted in effect requiring every person
suspected of crime to furnish the police a list of all the witnesses
whose testimony would convict him ?"los
Indeed, Mr. 1X7igmore himself declares that the protection of the
privilege "extends to all manner of proceedings in which testimony
is to be taken, whether litigious or not, and whether 'ex parte' or
otherwise. It therefore applies in... investigations by a legislature
or a body having legislative functions, and in investigations by
admnidstrative officials."' 10 If so, how can testimony taken by the
police be excluded? It is quite unnecessary to go to the extent
indicated by Mr. Chief Justice White in Brain v. United States :110
"In criminal trials, in the courts of the United States, wherever a
question arises whether a confession is incompetent because not
voluntary, the issue is controlled by that portion of the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, commanding
that no person 'shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself.' " He was speaking of an admission secured
by an officer of a foreign government while the accused was being
held by its police for a Consul General of the United States. The
language would be applicable to a confession obtained by a private
detective or by members of a mob, to whom obviously the Con-
stitutional provision has no application. But it should have applica-
tion to its police officers in quite as full measure as the provision
of the Fourth Amendment against unlawful search and seizure.
If the police of any government, state or federal, are exempt from
106. Emery's Case, 107 Mass. 172 (1871); Commonwealth v. Prince,
313 Mass. 223, 46 N. E. 2d 755 (1943).
107. Commonwealth v. Prince, 313 Mass. 223, 46 N. E. 2d 755 (1943).
108. Id. at 231.
109. 8 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 1, § 2252(c).
110. 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897).
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the prohibition of the privilege, then there may be grounds for pro-
found satisfaction in the recent decisions of the Supreme Court
holding that the use by a state court of a confession or admission
coerced by the police is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment."'
By the same reasoning its use in a federal court must be forbidden
by the corresponding provision of the Fifth Amendment.
C. Legislative Investigations
It is generally agreed that the privilege, both at common law
and as embodied in the Constitutions of the several states and of
the United States, is applicable in all judicial investigations. What
of investigations by a legislature or its committees? So far as
the common law privilege is concerned, it may, of course, be modi-
field or abolished by legislation, but the Constitutional privilege
has no such infirmity. Consequently, the problem is one of con-
stitutional interpretation. Speaking generally, the particular phras-
ing of the several provisions has had little or no effect upon their
respective interpretations. Some provisions apparently limit the
field of the privilege to "criminal cases"; others prohibit only the
compelling of a person to be "a witness against himself," some speak
in terms of the "accused." Yet the courts make the prohibition
applicable to all sorts of non-criminal judicial proceedings and
protect a person who is acting as a witness whether or not he is a
party to the litigation and whether or not a formal accusation
against him has been made or is contemplated ."12 And the Supreme
Court of South Carolina has held that the provision in the Consti-
tution of 1868, "No person shall be compelled to accuse or furnish
evidence against himself," has not been made less extensive by the
provision in the Constitution of 1895, "Nor shall [any person] be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."' 1 3
The legislative history of the Fifth Amendment, in so far as it
concerns the phrase, "in any criminal case," seems to furnish little
or no aid in interpretation.
1 4
While there can be no doubt that the Congress, through com-
mittees of the House and Senate, has the power to subpoena wit-
nesses and obtain from them pertinent information to aid it in
legislation-and apparently "the only legitimate object" is "to aid
111. See, e.g., Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49 (1949); Ashcraft v.
Tennessee, 327 U. S. 274 (1946).
112. See 8 Wigmore, op. cit. supra § 2252.
113. Ex parte Johnson, 187 S. C. 1, 7-8, 196 S. E. 164 (1938).
114. See Note, Applicability of Privilege against Self-Incrintination to
Legislative Investigations, 49 Col. L. Rev. 87, 90-94 (1949).
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it in legislating,""' yet that power "must be exerted with due re-
gard for the rights of witnesses" and "a witness rightfully may re-
fuse to answer where the bounds of the power are exceeded. .. ."
Mr. Justice Butler in the Sinclair case declared: "It has always been
recognized in this country, and it is well to remember, that few if
any of the rights of the people guarded by fundamental law are
of greater importance to their happiness and safety than the right
to be exempt from all unauthorized, arbitrary or unreasonable in-
quiries and disclosures in respect of their personal and private
affairs.""l6
It would seem clear that the right not to incriminate oneself is
included, as Chief Judge Cardozo assumed in Matter of Doyle.1 17
Indeed, the fair inference from the opinions of the United States
Supreme Court is that the privilege as established in the Fifth
Amendment 'protects witnesses in Congressional investigations as
fully as in judicial proceedings. But there is, as yet, no square de-
cision to that effect.
The leading case in state courts is Emery's Case."" The pro-
vision of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights has no limiting
clause: "No subject shall ... be compelled to accuse, or furnish
evidence against himself," although the marginal note, "Prosecu-
tions regulated," does indicate application to criminal proceed-
ings. The Supreme Judicial Court, after stating that the "prohibi-
tion extends to all investigations of an inquisitorial nature, insti-
tuted for the purpose of discovering crime, or the perpetrators of
crime, by putting suspected parties upon their examination in re-
spect thereto, in any manner.. ." went on:
"But it is not even thus limited. The principle applies
equally to any compulsory disclosure of his guilt by the
offender himself, whether sought directly as the object of the
inquiry, or indirectly and incidentally for the purpose of
establishing facts involved in an issue between other parties.
If the disclosure thus made would be capable of being used
against himself as a confession of crime, or an admission
of facts tending to prove the commission of an offence by
himself, in any prosecution then pending, or that might
be brought against him therefor, such disclosure would be
an accusation of himself, within the meaning of the con-
stitutional provision....
115. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135, 178 (1927).
116. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 263, 291-2 (1929).
117. 257 N. Y. 244, 263, 177 N. E. 489 (1931), citing Sinclair v.
United States, 279 U. S. 263 (1929).
118. 107 Mass. 172 (1871).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
".... There is nothing in the terms of the article in ques-
tion, to except legislative bodies from its operation. The
nature and purpose of the provisions are equally applicable
to investigations conducted by the legislature itself, or by one
of its branches, or by a committee of its own members, as
when conducted before the courts, or by commissioners, or
other tribunals established by law. Such tribunals can in no
case disregard this rule of protection. The legislature can-
not, by the most formal and solemn enactments of law,
authorize them to do it. If then the legislature cannot, by the
formal enactment of all its branches, subject a citizen to such
compulsory disclosure, it is difficult to see on what ground
of argument or inference, from necessity, propriety, or the
nature of constitutional republican government, an authority
can be deduced for either branch of the legislature to do so
by its more order.
"The protection of the subject is not secured by the Con-
stitution, if it may be so invaded .... If other means of dis-
covering offences and convicting offenders are thought to
be inefficient or unsatisfactory, investigations by direct
authority of the legislature, prompted by public complaints,
and intended primarily to furnish information upon which
that body may act in remedying abuses in the administration
of public affairs, may easily be perverted into an effective
means of procuring material to aid in the institution and
maintenance of criminal prosecutions. Committees of the
legislature, or commissioners acting under its order, to
inquire into any supposed failure to enforce the laws, if freed
from the restrictions of the Constitution in this particular,
may be found useful and efficient as auxiliaries of the grand
juries of the Commonwealth. In this way, parties exposed to
prosecutions would find their constiutional protection to
have failed them. It is the capability of abuse, and not the
probability of it, which is to be regarded in judging of the
reasons which lie at the foundation, and guide in the inter-
pretation, of such constiutional restrictions." 119
New York and South Carolina have in their Constiutions used
the language of the Fifth Amendment, but their courts of last resort
have reached the same conclusion.1 20 The Court of Appeals of
New York, in Matter of Doyle 12 1 speaking through Chief Judge
Cardozo, declared: "The privilege in New York applies to an
investigation by a Legislature as fully as to a trial in court.' 22
Earlier in the opinion the Chief Judge characterized the constitu-
119. Id. at 181,183.
120. Matter of Doyle, 257 N. Y. 244, 177 N. E. 489 (1931) ; Ex parte
Johnson, 187 S. C. 1, 8-9, 196 S. E. 164 (1938).
121. 257 N. Y. 244, 177 N. E. 489 (1931).
122. Id. at 263.
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tional provision as "a barrier interposed between the individual and
the power of the government, a barrier interposed by the soverign
people of the State"; which "neither legislators nor judges are
free to overleap .... ,, 2 Consequently he held the appellant "privi-
leged to refuse to answer question that may tend to implicate him
in a crime, unless by some act of amnesty or indemnity, or some
valid resolution equivalent thereto, he has been relieved from the
risk of prosecution for any felony or misdemeanor that his testi-
mony may reveal.'
124
As to these pronouncements there was no dissent. Judge
Pound's disagreement with his brethren concerned the sufficiency
of the immunity from prosecution afforded the appellant.
In Ex Parte Johlnson 25 the Supreme Court of South Carolina
held the privilege properly claimed by a witness before a legislative
committee:
"Manifestly these constitutional provisions are substan-
tially declaratory of the common law, and it is obvious
that if the privilege were limited to a criminal prosecution
in which the witness was the defendant, it would fail entirely
of its fundamental purpose. Hence it is uniformly held that
the privilege is one which may .be involved in any legal
investigation, whether judicial or quasi-judicial; that is to
say, it applies to examinations before any tribunal or other
body that has power to subpoena and compel the attendance
of witnesses."
Eniery's Case and Matter of Doyle were ably argued and the opin-
ions demonstrate thorough appreciation of the fundamental prob-
lem in the light of history and the essentials of official investigative
procedures. In Ex Parte Johnson the argument was not so well
buttressed by authorities, but the decision supported that of Mr.
justice Baker who had apparently put heavy reliance upon the
opinion of Chief Judge Cardozo in Matter of Doyle. These well
considered decisions, together with the assumptions and intima-
tions in the opinions of the United States Supreme Court, as well
as the generally accepted practice before legislative tribunals, seem
to warrant the prediction that the privilege will generally be held
available to witnesses in legislative investigations.12 6 At any rate
the legislative tribunal which proceeds on any other assumption
will carry a heavy burden. It is to be hoped that the burden will
123. Id. at 250.
124. Ibid.
125. 187 S. C. 1, 8, 196 S. E. 164 (1938).
126. See generally Ehrmann, Duty of Disclosure in Parlianentary In-
vestigation, 11 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 1, 19-20 (1943); id. at 117 (1944).
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prove too heavy to bear, for recent experience has demonstrated
that legislative tribunals are prone to ignore the personal rights
and liberties of citizens unless restrained by constitutional pro-
hibitions.
D. Production of Writings
To what extent does the privilege protect a person from the
production of a writing in his possession? In The King v. PurnelP27
both Court and counsel took it for granted that a defendant need not
produce books containing matter incriminating him. And in Roe v.
Harvey,ll' s where the question was as to the effect of the refusal
of a plaintiff in ejectment to produce a revelant deed, one of the
justices, Yates, went so far as to say that the plaintiff was under
no obligation to produce it, for "no man can be obliged to produce
evidence against himself." But the other judges seem to have agreed
with Lord Mansfield that "in civil causes, the Court will force
parties to produce evidence which may prove against themselves....
But in a criminal or penal cause, the defendant is never forced to
produce any evidence: though he should hold it in his hands, in
Court." ' 9 The language in these cases seems to indicate that the
privilege applies to all documents in the possession of the person
whom their contents will criminate. If so, it is subject to much
qualification by the American cases.
In Wilson v. United States,"30 the Court pointed out that a per-
son who has custody of public records or official documents has no
privilege to refuse to produce them even though they contain
matter incriminating him personally. They are held "subject to
examination by the demanding authority. . . . In assuming their
custody he has accepted the incident obligation to permit inspec-
tion."' 31 In like manner the custodian of the books of a corporation
holds them subject to the visitatorial power of the Government.
This principle was held to be well established in Essgee Co. of China
v. United States. 32 An officer of a corporation "in whose custody
are its books and papers is given no right to object to the production
of the corporate records because they may disclose his guilt." In the
Austin-Bagley case'3 3 the Court required the officer not only to
produce the corporate books but also to identify them as books of
127. 1 Wm. B1.37 (1748).
128. 4 Burr. 2484 (K.B. 1769).
129. Id. at 2489.
130. 221 U. S. 361 (1911).
131. Id. at 382.
132. 262 U. S. 151, 158 (1923).




the corporate defendant. It will be noted that the basis of these
decisions is the public or semi-public character of the documents.
Incidentally, they were not the property of the custodian but of
the corporation.
Of what significance is this fact of ownership? In Ex Parte
Filler,' 4 the Supreme Court held that a bankrupt might be com-
pelled to turn over to the Receiver his books which contained
incriminating matter, because by operation of law the title and
right to possession of the books had passed to the Receiver; it was
immaterial that the transferee was or might be properly subject
to a subpoena duces tecum. In McCarthy v. Arndstein,135 Mr.
justice Brandeis explained the F::!3er decision on the ground that
the "privilege relates to the adjective law. It does not relieve one
from compliance with the substantive obligation to surrender prop-
erty." If this explanation is correct, it would seem to follow that if
A has possession of a document which contains matter incriminat-
ing him and the document is the property of B, A cannot be re-
quired to produce it by process issuing against him as a witness.
B may be entitled to get it by common law or equitable replevin and
B may be required to produce it by process applicable to a witness;
but if B is content to let A keep the document, A is safe. That such
is not the case is demonstrated by United States v. White.' 6 There
the president of a local of the International Union of Operating
Engineers was served with a subpoena duces tecum to produce
specified records of the Union (which was unincorporated) before
a grand jury. He refused on the ground that the records might
tend to incriminate the local and himself as an officer or individual.
The District Court found him guilty of contempt and sentenced him
to 30 days in prison. On appeal the Third Circuit reversed, dis-
tinguishing a union from a corporation. The Supreme Court on
certiorari reversed the Circuit Court of Appeals. The decision can-
not be termed illiberal, for the opinion is by that great champion
of all sections of the Bill of Rights pertaining to the liberties of
the person, the late Mr. Justice Murphy. After stating that the
privilege "protects the individual from any disclosure, in the form
of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by legal process
against him as a witness"-a generalization which would seem to fit
this case exactly-Mr. Justice Murphy goes on to state the decisive
applicable principle. "MHoreover, the papers and effects which the
134. 262 U. S. 91 (1923).
135. 266 U. S. 34. 41 (1924).
136. 322 U. S. 694 (1944).
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privilege protects must be the private property of the person claim-
ing them, or at least in his possession in a purely personal capacity
(citation). But individuals, when acting as representatives of a
collective group, cannot be said to be exercising their personal rights
and duties nor to be entitled to their purely personal privileges." 13'
It is on this ground and not on the basis of waiver or of the visita-
torial powers of government over corporations that the decision
squarely rests. And when the issue is whether the possessor of the
document is holding it in a personal or representative capacity, the
test is whether "a particular type of organization has a character
so impersonal in the scope of its membership and activities that it
cannot be said to embody or ren)resent the purely private or per-
sonal interests of its constituents, but rather to embody their
common or group interests only. . . .Labor unions-national or
local, incorporated or unincorporated---clearly meet that test."1'3
It must, then, be taken as settled that the federal constitutional
privilege does not protect an individual from producing in response
to subpoena (a) a writing which is of a public or semi-public
character or (b) a writing of which he is not entitled to posses-
sion in his capacity as an individual. The state courts are at pres-
ent free to give a different interpretation to their respective con-
stitutional provisions, for the Supreme Court has thus far adhered
to its previous position that the privilege against self-incrimination
is not so "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' '±n" or so
"basic to a free society"''1 0 as to be comprehended in the due process
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.1
4
'
Wigmore, following the reasoning of Mr. Justice Hughes in
the Wilson case,142 puts on the same basis as public records, those
required to be kept by a private citizen, such as a pharmacist, a
druggist, a pawnbroker. The citizen is in this respect an ad hoc
public official. In practically all the cases which he cites, the citi-
zen required to make the record was required also to have a license
to conduct the activity the details of which he was obliged to
record. But Wigmore doesn't put the exemption from the privilege
on the ground of consent by the licensee, as the courts do. He
137. Id. at 699.
138. Id. at 701.
139. Mr. Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325
(1937).
140. Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 27
(1949).
141. Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46 (1947), 171 A. L. R. 1223
(1947); Comment, The Adamson Case, 58 Yale L. J. 267 (1949).
142. 221 U. S. 361,381 (1911).
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makes the following generalization: "There is no compulsory self-
crimination in a rule of law which merely requires beforehand a
future report on a class of future acts among which a particular
one may or may not in future be criminal at the choice of the
party reporting.' 43 He goes on to say that the same generaliza-
tion is applicable to a requirement that a person, who is in no
sense an ad hoc official, retain in his custody articles which may
turn out to be evidences of a crime, e.g. the hide of every bovine
animal slaughtered by him. Likewise it is the support of statutes
requiring oral or written reports of the circumstances of any in-
jury caused by the vehicle, machinery or other property of the
reporter. This is because "the duty applies to a generic class of
acts, irrespective of the criminality of any particular one (and it
is certain that only an occasional one will involve criminality);
and the duty exists anterior to the whole series of acts, so that
the possible criminality is due to the party's own election, and
the duty is independent of it. That the report may in a given case
be later used in a criminal proceding and that such a possible use
was forseen by the legislator, does not alter the fact that the duty
existed prior to and independent of the criminality."'144 There
may be a possible qualification in the term "generic class of acts"
which will save the generalization from utter absurdity. If the
killing of a bovine animal is a generic class of act, and the conduct
of a citizen outside the limits of his own home between 11 p.m. and
daylight is not a generic class of act, then it might be possible
to uphold a statute which requires a report, and saving of the
hide, of every bovine animal killed by a citizen, and to strike down
a statute which requires a report of all acts done by each citizen
outside the limits of his own home between 11 p.m. and day-
light. Unless "generic class" is a limiting term, Wigmore's generali-
zation would permit the destruction of the privilege in all or
almost all situations by ingeniously drawn legislation. It does
no more than state the result of the decisions in a form which will
not bear analysis.
It is needless to say that no court has formulated or adopted
such a generalization. In situations where a license is required
for engaging in the activity and the objecting party is a licensee,
judicial reliance for support of the regulation is upon waiver by
acceptance of the license, as in State v. Sterrin.145 It would not be
143. 8 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 1, § 2259(c).
144. Id. § 2259(d).
145. 78 N. H. 220, 98 AtI. 482 (1916).
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difficult to produce arguments based upon the historical back-
ground of the privilege for the proposition that it never was con-
ceived to have application to such situations, and to buttress them
by considerations of over-powering public policy for the preserva-
tion of life, property and public safety. Where the activity is such
that the state may properly require a license which would operate
as a waiver of the privilege, it may impose an equivalent condition
upon engaging in the activity. On this theory the statutes are
justified which authorize service of process without the state
on non-resident motorists in actions brought against them for
injuries inflicted within the state.14 6
E. Bodily or M1lental Examination
Is the privilege limited to testimonial compulsion, that is, does
it protect a person from anything other than compelling him to
make, by words or other conduct, a communication "upon which
reliance is to be placed as involving his consciousness of the facts
and the operations of his mind in expressing it ?-147 Does it cover
personal features, qualities, or condition which he can not con-
trol? Specifically does it apply to the objective appearance of his
body, his Bertillion measurements, his fingerprints, his foot-
prints, the chemical content of his urine, of his saliva, of his blood,
and the like? If the language of the applicable constitutional provi-
sion is interpreted as forbidding the compulsory furnishing of
evidence, it seems fairly obvious that it covers all these; but if it
is interpreted in the light of the origin and early purpose of the
privilege it will be confined to those items of conduct which are
used as conscious expressions of ideas. The conflicting views have
been so thoroughly considered in treatises and decisions that fur-
ther discussion would be a waste of time. 4 " But attention must be
called to the importance of a practical solution of the problem in
current litigation, for example, in prosecutions for drunken driving
and for crimes involving intent where the psychiatric condition
of the accused is cruicial, as well as in other situations where ex-
amination of the body of an accused may reveal matter, a scientific
examination of which will furnish persuasive circumstantial evi-
146. See Restatement, Conflict of Laws §§ 84 and 85 and Comments(1934), and the recent Amendment affecting them.
147. 8 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 2263, 2265.
148. For fingerprinting see United States v. Kelly, 55 F. 2d 67 (2d
Cir. 1932) ; Shannon v. State, 207 Ark. 658, 182 S. W. 384 (1944) ; foot-
prints, cases collected in 64 A. L. R. 1085, 1089 (1930) ; physical examina-




dence of guilt. An example of the extremely liberal view with
reference to tests for intoxication is found in a recent Wisconsin
case.' 41 The accused upon arrest was compelled to go with a
policeman to the office of a doctor, who noted the defendant's
mental attitude, the odor of his breath, congestion of his eyelids and
rate of pulse. Defendant was then required to write his name, to
stand with his feet together and eyes closed and to touch the tip
of his nose with the tip of each index finger alternately, and to
"protrude his tongue from-into a midline." His speech and gait
were observed and his deep and superficial reflexes were tested.
The receipt of the testimony of the doctor that in his opinion,
based on this examination, the defendant was suffering from acute
alcoholism was held not to be a violation of the privilege against
self-incrimination. In a Texas case where accused was required
to perform some of the same acts as in the Wisconsin case and to
furnish a sample of his urine for analysis, the court held the privilege
violated.' " The liberal attitude of the Wisconsin Court is matched
by that of the majority of the Supreme Court of Oregon in ad-
mitting against defendant evidence of an analysis of a sample of
his blood taken from him while unconscious.151
Wherever the evidence is confined to descriptions of involuntary
reactions of the accused or to qualities of his body substances beyond
his power of control, its admissibility is clearly justified by the more
liberal interpretation of the constitutional provision. Where, how-
ever, he is compelled to do acts which he can use as a means of
conveying ideas, the reception of evidence of his conduct raises
serious questions as to the extent to which practical considerations
affecting efficient enforcement of the law under modern con-
ditions may be safely permitted to limit the right of privacy and
personal liberty., 2
F. Jurisdictional Limits of the Privilege
Whether the privilege operates outside the jurisdictional limits
of the government whose court or legislature has created it is the
subject of conflicting decisions."- In the Murdock case," 4 the
149. Green Lake County v. Domes, 247 Wis. 90, IS N. W. 2d 348(1945), 159 A. L. R. 204 (1945).
150. Apodaca v. State, 140 Tex. Cr. 593, 146 S. W. 2d 381 (1941).
151. State v. Cram, 176 Ore. 577, 160 P. 2d 283 (1945), 164 A. L. R. 952(1945).
152. See generally Ladd and Gibson, Legal-Medical Aspects of Blood
Tests to Determine Intoxication, 29 Va. L. Rev. 749 (1943).
153. 8 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 1, § 2258.
154. United States v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 141 (1931).
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Supreme Court first flatly decided that a person "under examina-
tion in a federal tribunal could not refuse to answer on account
of probable incrimination under state law." " It stated the rule in
unmistakable language: "The principle established is that full and
complete immunity against prosecution by the government com-
pelling the witness to answer is equivalent to the protection furnish-
ed by the rule against compulsory self-incrimination."'' 1 It cannot
be said that Mr. Justice Butler's opinion is convincing. He asserted:
"The English rule of evidence against compulsory self-incrimina-
tion, on which historically that contained in the Fifth Amendment
rests, does not protect witnesses against disclosing offenses in
violation of the laws of another country." He cited King of the
Two Sicilies v. Willcox, 15 7 and Queen v. Boyes.15 The Willcox
case rested on the ground that no English judge can know, as a
matter of law, what would be penal in a foreign country, and that
to make the disclosures dangerous the disclosing party must first
quit the protection of the English law and wilfully go within the
jurisdiction of the laws he has violated. The Boyes case had to do
with immunity from prosecution in the courts which would not
protect from impeachment by Parliament-obviously not a case
of foreign law at all-and was decided on the express ground that
the danger of impeachment was no more than a remote possibility.
The Willcox case was distinguished in United States v. McRae,1'5
where the pleadings showed that proceedings were pending in the
United States for the forfeiture of the objector's property. In the
first place, it should be noted that a decision in 1850 would scarcely
exhibit the historical scope of the English privilege; next, that the
Willcox reasoning had no application to the situation before the
Court in the Murdock case, and that a later case by a court of equal
rank was a square authority against Mr. Justice Butler's position.
Of course, this is not to say that as an original question the Court
and Wigmore16° are wrong in holding that a rule established by
one sovereignty for the protection of its citizens against govern-
mental action should be confined to action by that government alone.
Certainly the Fifth Amendment is a limitation only upon the
powers of the Federal Government, and the provisions of any state
constitution can have no limiting effect upon the powers of the
155. United States v. Murdock, 290 U. S. 389, 396 (1933).
156. United States v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 141, 149 (1931).
157. 7 State Trials n.s. 1050, 1068 (1850).
158. 1 Best & Smith, 311, 330 (1861).
159. L. R. 4 Eq. 327, L. R. 3 Ch. App. 79 (1867).
160. 8 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 1, § 2258.
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Federal Government or of that of any other state.. To be sure,
a State may, if it chooses, so interpret its own provisions as to
protect all persons against compulsory disclosure by its officers of
matter which would expose them to danger of prosecution in any
other jurisdiction or by any other sovereignty. The problem pre-
sented is one of policy, and some states refuse to accept the rule
of the Mlturdock case.' 61
Granting the soundness of the Mu1itrdock doctrine, what is to
happen when in the courts of sovereignty A a person is compelled
to criminate himself under an immunity statute and the incriminat-
ing statements are offered against him in a prosecution in
sovereignty B?
If the evidence obtained by a violation of D's privilege in juris-
diction A is offered in jurisdiction B, the rules of B governing
illegally obtained evidence are applicable; if obtained under an
immunity statute, there is no taint of illegality. In either situation,
does B's constitutional provision affect admissibility? Certainly A's
constitution cannot operate to restrict the powers of B, or grant D
an immunity against testifying in B. It seems equally obvious that
when a court of B compels W to testify to words previously uttered
by D, it is not compelling D to be a witness against himself or to
testify against himself. This is literally true even where the words
were the result of conduct on the part of officials of B in the course
of an official investigation which violated D's constitutional privi-
lege; but in this situation, the courts have applied not the rules
applicable to illegally obtained evidence but those applicable to the
constitutional prohibition. D's privilege to refuse to disclose self-
incriminating material applies to inquiries made for the government
of B by its official investigators. And adequate protection of the
privilege requires the exclusion of evidence obtained by such a
violation of the privilege, regardless of the medium by which it is
presented in court. Does the same reasoning compel a construction
of B's constitutional provision which requires -its courts to exclude
self-incriminating evidence obtained by representatives of A by
lawful means which, if used by representatives of B, would have
been excluded because of D's privilege? The majority of the United
States Supreme Court has recently answered in the negative.
Evidence of self-incriminating testimony given by D in a New York
court under an immunity statute was held admissible against him
in a criminal prosecution in a federal court sitting in New York.16 2
161. See, e.g., In re Watson. 293 Mich. 263. 291 N. W. 652 (1940).
162. Feldman v. United States, 322 U. S. 487, 498 (1944).
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The minority insisted that to hold that a federal court "can convict
a defendant of a federal crime by use of self-incriminatory testi-
mony which someone in some manner has extracted from him
against his will... cuts into the very substance of the Fifth Amend-
ment."
This talk of the minority is not limited to a contention that as a
matter of comity, a federal court sitting in a state should assist in
its administration of justice by treating evidence procured by the
state in exchange for a grant of immunity as inadmissible, in order
to strengthen the inducement to a witness in the state court to
make disclosure rather than to suffer the penalty imposable for
refusal to do so. It is not even limited to the usual contention that
the Fourteenth Amendment embodies the provisions of the Fifth.
It would recognize no exception to the prohibition "based upon the
persons who compel, their purpose in compelling or their method
of compelling whether by threats of imprisonment, physical torture
or other means."16 3 This would make the Fifth Amendment ap-
plicable to private individuals as well as to officers of government
and come close to accepting at face value the dictum in the
Brain case, that in the Fifth Amendment is imbedded the rule
excluding improperly induced confessions. 165 It may be that the
dissenters mean only to hold that the Amendment forbids the
reception of the wrongfully secured evidence by a federal court,
not the action of non-federal officials in obtaining it. Even so, it
is submitted that the contention is unsound and that the real issue
is one of comity and policy. 66
G. Waiver by Testifying
The extent to which a person waives his privilege by testifying
is the subject of conflicting decisions. By the English rule he may
stop at any point. The American cases reveal various views. If
the witness is the accused himself they run the gamut from no
waiver to complete waiver; for the ordinary witness, they usually
limit the waiver to matters connected with the conduct to which
he has already testified. In the Federal Courts, the decisions of the
Supreme Court are far from clear, but they imply that the accused
163. Id. at 497.
164. Brain v. United States, 168 U. S. 532 (1897). See note 110 supra.
165. See Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-In-
crimination Clause, 29 Mich. L. Rev. 191, 201 (1930). It seems to accept
this d*ctum.
166. See Comments in 30 Cornell L. Q. 255 (1944) ; 39 Ill. L. Rev.
184 (1944) ; 53 Yale L. J. 364 (1944).
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and every other witness is subject to cross-examination upon all
matters relevant to the content of his direct examination. 167 And
where his testimony amounts to a denial of his guilt, he may be
compelled to disclose that upon a former trial or upon a prelimi-
nary hearing he had not taken the stand.16 ' Mr. Justice Stone
found the argument fanciful which assumed that a rule admitting
such evidence "might operate to bring pressure to bear on the
accused to take the stand on the first trial, for fear of the con-
secitence of his silence in the event of the second trial .... e are
,Mable to s'ee that the rule that if he testifies, he must testify fully,
adds in any substantial manner to the inescapable embarrassment
which the accused must experience in determining whether he shall
testify or not."", But the Supreme Court of Missouri found this
reasoning unpersuasive, cited the conflicting authorities, and in-
sisted that the defendant should be completely free to exercise the
privilege and that "no suspicion or incrimination should follow."' 170
No satisfactory solution of the problem can be based upon con-
jectures as to an accused's speculations of imagined or possible ad-
vantages or disadvantages in later stages of the case or in other
litigation. The answer should depend upon more fundamental con-
siderations; and as to the impact of these upon the problem, judg-
ments may well differ.
In a unique case the majority of the Circut Court of Appeals of
the Second Circuit assumed that in an adversary proceeding a
witness who has revealed part of a transaction must reveal it all,
in detail, and that this is especially true where he has disclosed
all the elements of a crime; it had to determine whether this was
true as to testimony before a grand jury or other tribunal in a
non-adversary investigation. In United States v. St. Pierre,17' St.
Pierre had confessed before the grand jury that he had embezzled
certain money, but he refused to disclose the name of the person
to whom the money belonged. His contention was that if he were
indicted and put on trial for the offense, his confession, though re-
167. See, e.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470, 492-495,
(1917).
168. Raffel v. United States, 271 U. S. 494 (1926).
169. Id. at 498, 499.
170. State v. Conway, 348 Mo. 580, 589, 154 S. W. 2d 128 (1941). See
also Hall Motor Freight v. Montgomery, 357 Mo. 1188, 212 S. W. 2d 748
(1948), 2 A. L. R. 2d 1292 (1948), applying the same reasoning to exclude
in a civil action evidence that defendant failed to testify in a former criminal
prcceeding growing out of the same conduct.
171. 132 F. 2d 837 (2d Cir. 1942).
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ceivable and received against him, would not support a conviction
without corroboration; and that to reveal the identity of the person
to whom the money belonged would furnish the prosecution with
the means of securing the necessary corroboration. The Federal
rule as to what constitutes incriminating evidence includes evidence
of any fact tending to criminate though the fact is not a constituent
element of any crime. Hence the name of the wronged person
would be incriminating; and the problem was solely one of waiver.
Judge Learned Hand wrote the opinion holding that the wax¢rer
was complete, and Judge Clark agreed. Judge Frank dissented b( -
cause St. Pierre had not revealed enough to subject him to a
penalty. Judge Hand's opinion pointed out (a) that St. Pierre had
fully revealed the commission of a crime but refused to answer
as to a detail and (b) that no decision dealing with waiver had
ever suggested a distinction between an adversary and an inquisi-
tory proceeding. He concluded that "surely, we should not resort
to so unnecessary and deplorable an innovation." Judge Frank
began by apparently attributing to the majority the notion that the
privilege is effective not to prevent a disclosure which will result in
punishment, but one which will result in disgrace. This unjustifiable
assumption the majority would doubtless repudiate, and labor to
refute it would be wasted. But what Judge Frank stressed was
that there is no complete voluntary abandonment of the privilege
by a person until the disclosure is of sufficient facts to subject him
to punishment, although the privilege itself protects him from dis-
closing any fact that would tend to subject him to punishment.
Certainly St. Pierre had disclosed the commission of a crime which
as a matter of substantive law subjected him to punishment, but
he had not revealed the source of sufficient admissible evidence to
justify a conviction under the rules applicable in the Federal Courts.
If we accept this line of reasoning, how can we make any distinction
between an adversary and an inquisitory proceeding? Whether or
not it would be unfair to the adversary to permit a witness to tell
a half truth or give a garbled account can have no bearing at all
on whether he has disclosed enough to enable the state to secure
sufficient admissible evidence to justify his conviction. He is not a
party to the proceeding or affected by the evidence. The remedy is
not to destroy the privilege but protect the adverse party by striking
out the evidence. To prevail, Judge Frank will have to stand on
substantially the English rule. He must contend that a witness may
stop at any moment until he has revealed facts which will subject
[Vol. 34:1
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him to a penalty under the rules of law, procedural and subtantive,
of the jurisdiction where the disclosure is made. This is a con-
tention that in effect abolishes waiver. If it is sound, it should be
applied in all situations. There is no place for a rational distinction
in this respect between an ex parte proceeding and an adversary
proceeding.
